February 2020 | www.sayer.com
58
A
LTHOUGH there has
been much debate, nger-
pointing and blaming poor
aircraft systems design
in the above examples,
there is a commonality when we look at
the beginning and the end of the chain of
events that led to these and other disasters.
In these examples, the very rst links in the
chains were failures of simple sensors: iced
pitot tubes on the Airbus, and faulty angle of
attack (AOA) sensors on the Boeings.
The result was, in the case of the Airbus,
the aircraft pitched steeply upwards and
stalled all the way down from 35,000 feet
until it impacted the ocean. In the case of the
Boeings, both aircraft pitched steeply nose-
down until they struck the surface.
In highly automated aircraft such as
these, the designers made provision for, and
relied on, the crew to take appropriate action
in the event of such fairly minor failures.
Yet, in the Airbus instance, the crew had
full manual control and held the nose up
in a prolonged stall, and the Boeing crews
neglected to maintain control by timeously
disabling the trim motors and throttling back,
thereby allowing the aircraft to keep pitching
down and increasing speed until manual
recovery was no longer an option.
Similar accidents occur in much simpler
light aircraft, often where the pilot freezes’
at the controls, or fails to take simple actions
to recover from an upset or minor failure and
thus allowing the aircraft to hit terrain.
Why are these kinds of accidents so
common, especially in general aviation
aircraft? In these accidents, there
are always other options, alternative
instruments, alternative actions and
alternative procedures that the pilot can use
to turn the event into a mere inconvenience
or a minor fright, instead of a fatal accident.
MAGICAL THINKING
When faced with an unexpected threat,
panic or ‘startle response’ are often blamed
as the causes of pilot inaction, but these are
both transient effects that usually precede
the ght or ight’ instinctive response to
danger. Fighting or eeing are positive
natural responses, rather than the apathy
and grossly wrong responses that so often
characterise pilot behaviour in these types
of accidents.
In the 737 Max and AF447 accident
examples, the crew had plenty of time,
training and experience to perform the
correct actions, yet they went on to commit
errors that are unlikely even for raw student
pilots.
‘Magical thinking’ is a term used in
many elds of study, such as psychology,
psychiatry, philosophy and anthropology.
The term denotes the belief that one’s
thoughts alone can bring about effects in the
real world. This is a cognitive distortion in
which individuals believe that their thoughts
or unrelated actions will directly inuence
and produce a specic outcome, either
positive or negative.
MAGICAL THINKING &
BOILED FROGS
AOPA BRIEFING
CHRIS MARTINUS - PRESIDENT AIRCRAFT OWNERS & PILOTS ASSOCIATION SOUTH AFRICA
South Africans are frozen
at the controls like the
proverbial frog in a pot.
A recurring problem in aviation accidents
is that pilots fail to take appropriate action
when things start going wrong. The recent
Boeing 737 Max tragedies seem to support
that. Several other major accidents, most
notably the Air France 447 Airbus A330
disaster are indicative of this problem.
www.sayer.com | February 2020
59
We all do it from time to time. The words
‘hope’ and ‘faith’ often reect that way of
thinking. Saying to ourselves that ‘everything
will be okay’ is a common everyday example.
We often hear people use terms like ‘positive
thinking’ or ‘negativity’ as being important
attributes. But although these ideas may
make us feel better, in themselves they have
no direct effect upon the real world in any
way whatsoever.
Magical thinking is a major symptom
of obsessive-compulsive disorder, where
the sufferer is irrationally afraid of stepping
on the cracks in the pavement, fervently
believes that excessive hand-washing
protects against all ills, or that locking the
door ve times or switching the light on and
off several times will protect against non-
specic dangers.
But we all do it: we keep our ngers
crossed or hold thumbs in the irrational hope
that this will directly affect outcomes when we
are experiencing worrying circumstances.
In the same way, a pilot may be paralysed
into inaction in the fervent hope that a
dangerous and unexpected problem will go
away by itself. Or the pilot may take actions
which are hopelessly inappropriate in the
circumstances. In effect, the pilot mentally
withdraws from the situation, ineffectually
leaving fate to deal with it.
Practising the proper responses while
doing recurrent training in an aircraft or a
simulator is the rst line of defence against
this very common tendency. However, during
such training, the pilot is still consciously and
subconsciously aware that this is just a drill.
More importantly, almost every emergency is
different, and it is difcult to prepare a pilot
for every possible eventuality through the
use of a multitude of rules or procedures.
Much has been written and debated
about the lack of training for the specic
effects of a trim runaway caused by Boeing’s
ill-fated MCAS system, or Airbus’ lack of
specic procedures for landing in the Hudson
River after sucking a ock of birds into both
engines 2,800 feet above New York City.
But the knee-jerk response of mandating
event-specic training and adding to already
voluminous procedures is, for the most part,
counterproductive and impractical.
Pilots need greater self-discipline
and encouragement to adopt a mindset
where they are better equipped to revert
to common sense and exercising their
discretion rationally, rather than simply
being programmed like computers into
having specic responses to a myriad of
specic circumstances. Every accident is
circumstantially different, and the pilot needs
to use his or her noodle to get out of those
circumstances. Simply using a recipe-book
to respond to every emergency is a sure way
to quickly cook one’s goose.
There must obviously be broadly
applicable emergency checklists, but overly
detailed manuals of procedure lead to the
inappropriate belief that the books contain
magic potions for every possible ailment or
need. The pilot needs to be able to very
quickly decide if he’s on his own, or if the
books contain incantations that will save the
souls of all aboard.
BOILED FROGS
Magical thinking is a problem in a far
broader sense than just ying the aircraft.
In South Africa, we face a wider range of
threats to aviation than just making the
correct control inputs, particularly in respect
of general aviation.
Mere positive thinking, mental
withdrawal and humble appeasement of
those in authority are hopelessly ineffective
instruments for dealing with the socio-
political circumstances which prevail against
general aviation at present, as well as the
dangers to the country’s economy and social
fabric in a much broader sense.
South Africans are painfully unable to
comprehend how democracy works. South
Africa’s European population have historically
only known oppressive and dictatorial
government under British colonialism,
followed by imperious National Party rule.
The African population only ever knew
tribal government, under autocratic kings
and chiefs. We simply lack the historical
experience to benecially use democracy for
the purposes for which it is intended.
Democracy is participative. It only
works if the public use the constitutional
facilities that protect minorities and even
individuals, as well as giving them a say in
the affairs which directly affect their lives.
As a consequence, South Africans generally
suffer from many forms of magical thinking.
They whine and moan at each other about
government and its failings at braais, parties
at the pub and on social media. But they
are preaching to the choir. Their incessant
complaining has no effect. The complaining
is not heard, or is ignored, by the very people
who should be hearing it. The public make
little or no use of the legal and constitutional
opportunities that are there for them to be
heard and to be noticed by the people who
are required to serve them.
Another cognitive distortion they suffer
is the belief that the ballot box is paramount.
They believe that if their group is outvoted
by another that their rights are void. They
think democracy is simple majoritarianism
and that their minority votes and views don’t
count.
Most people believe that positive thinking
alone will effect positive changes. They extol
the virtues of Mrs Ball’s Chutney and African
sunsets on #ImStaying and other social
media and in private messaging groups,
thinking that this will effect positive changes.
They decry those of their compatriots who
warn of impending dangers as ‘negative’.
They believe that their own denialism and
hiding their heads in the sand and WhatsApp
is really ‘optimism’. They see others who
COLUMNS
IN SOUTH AFRICA,
WE FACE A WIDER
RANGE OF THREATS
TO AVIATION